First, this
August 14 Financial Times article will be referenced as it
essentially echoes this publication's original assessment of the transaction
upon announcement last month. Of particular interest in this piece are the
following passages from an third-part analytical report:
"An analyst report by Sanford C. Bernstein
Co dated 18 July outlines 13 overlaps where Teva and Barr own a majority of the
market. For example, Chlorzoxazone is one product where Barr owns 52% of the
market share and Teva 48%, with only five total competitors. Other drugs
include Tetracycline (Barr: 11%, Teva: 88%, 10 total competitors); Ethosuximide
(Barr: 63%, Teva: 25%, three total competitors) and Metronidazole (Barr: 44%,
Teva: 38%, 26 total competitors).
"The analyst, however, who is familiar with regulatory
reviews in the space, said he believed the FTC would be able to conclude its
investigation before the end of the year. He said many of the relevant markets
in this transaction have been examined during prior generic drug merger
reviews, which include Teva and Barr acquisitions.
"To further expedite the situation, the analyst
remarked that the section handling this transaction at the FTC is staffed with
many of the same attorneys and economists who were involved in prior
genericpharmaceutical reviews."
While this publication tends to agree with this assessment
in general, the very acknowledgment of multiple direct overlaps, combined with
exceedingly high market shares, should in now way be considered an indication
of a rapid HSR review. On the contrary, this information provides even more
weight to the probability of a fairly lengthy FTC/DOJ review, even when
factoring in both companies' familiarity and experience with the regulatory
processes.
Second, it is also important to reference this
2006
report from Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati, which a brief, but excellent
overview of the FTC's habits in the most recent major generic drug mergers.
This document should be considered required reading for this transaction as it
relates directly to this transaction with respect to the outcome and timing of
the HSR review. Some key passages include the following:
"The FTC has gained considerable experience
in reviewing generic drug mergers over the past two years. This experience
should help expedite review of these transactions, as often the same staff
attorneys and economists will be involved in generic drug merger reviews. Based
upon these past investigations, companies engaged in generic drug mergers with
overlaps should expect the length of the investigation to last approximately
three to six months.
"The number of products involved likely will have an
impact on the duration of the investigation. It is no accident that Watson /
Andrx (13 products divested) and Teva / Ivax (15 products divested) were the
longest investigations, at approximately five and a half and six months,
respectively. In comparison, the review of Barr / Pliva (three generic products
divested) took three and a half months and Novartis / Eon (three products
divested) took approximately five months. The more product markets to
investigate, the longer the investigation likely will last."
Given that the first report identifies as many as 20
overlaps, and the second report cites two previous transactions (ADRX-WPI IVX-TEVA) with similar
overlap levels, it is only logical to use the timing of those to deals as a
direct reference point for the BRL-TEVA deal. The timelines for these completed
transactions are as follows:
| Transaction |
Length
(Days) |
$ |
HSR |
SEC |
MISC |
| Ivax Corp (IVX) - Teva
Pharmaceutical (TEVA) |
185 |
7.4b |
137 |
52 |
EU
39
|
| Andrx (ADRX) - Watson
Pharmaceuticals (WPI) |
236 |
1.9b |
215 |
20 |
|
Note that these are strict timelines that do not factor in
the positive aspect of FTC and/or company experience or the negative aspect of
the intensified consolidation that this transaction clearly represents. They
also do not factor in the seasonal timing of this deal which will not be able
to avoid at least one major U.S. holiday season, and likely will intersect with
the December/January holidays as well. Furthermore, if the current FTC is
unable to reach a decision before the end of the year -- which is clearly a
possibility, if not probability -- there is the potential that this case will
encounter a transition from the current FTC administration to a new
administration.
In short, the factors which would normally indicate that
this deal, despite its obvious competitions issues and overall magnitude, can
obtain HSR clearance relatively quickly seem to be negated by other factors,
such as consolidation, overlap volume, and seasonality. As tempting as it is to
suggest that the companies can complete the HSR process before the end of this
year, this just does not seem feasible under the circumstances. This would only
be possible if a second request concluded without forced divestitures,
and this is absolutely not going to happen in this case.
Therefore, a best-case scenario for this deal's timing
remains perceived at about six months, which would put the close in mid-January
2009. It is just as likely, if not more likely, that the close will be pushed
beyond January and into the latter part of Q1 2009.