As everyone by now knows, a massive intervention Thursday by the Fed and the US Treasury, which the Financial Times calls “the most extensive peacetime expansion of the role of government in the financial system since the Great Depression,” and seemingly coordinated world-wide, caused a huge rally in global stock markets. Chinese markets were no exception.
Thursday night, the night before the intervention, the government had independently signaled its own worries about the markets by dropping the 0.1% stamp duty on stock purchases (the duty remains on stock sales) and announcing to the media that Central Huijin, an arm of the CIC, would buy shares in three of the Big Four banks (all except Agricultural Bank, which has not yet had its IPO). Why only banks, if the goal was to support the broad market? Perhaps in part because banks are a large part of the index and because the mechanism (Central Huijin) was already in place, but I suspect that at least part of the reason had to do with concerns about the self-reinforcing positive feedback loop between stock prices and perception of creditworthiness that was such an important part of the banking crisis story in the US.
I don’t think the reduction in stamp tax had much impact, but coming as it did with the stock purchase plan and the huge global rally, China’s stock markets flew on Friday. The SSE Composite immediately shot up on opening, wobbled a bit for a few minutes, and then recovered so that within the first 30 minutes it was up 9.5%, to trade flat the rest of the day, closing at 2075. For those wondering why it traded so flat for most of the day, remember that the Chinese markets have a 10% rule, which causes trading to stop when a stock is up or down by 10% within the trading day. Normally, when the market trades at its limit for most of the day, the momentum is carried forward onto the next day.
Will it maintain the momentum beyond a few days? I doubt it. If Chinese share had declined because of liquidity issues affecting the US and global markets, I would argue that the various interventions might be enough to resolve what was, after all, “just” a technical liquidity problem. However because of fairly strict capital and investment restrictions there is very little connection between China’s financial markets and global financial markets, so it seems to me that nothing fundamentally has changed. In addition I don’t think the full extent of the international crisis has yet hit China – there are transmission lags in both the capital account and in real economic links – and so we are likely to see more problems before the crisis is safely behind us.
At any rate my Peking University graduate student Shang Ning, being very curious, immediately decided to see what has typically happened when the Shanghai market has moved up by 8% or more in one day.