The following is
an analysis complimenting Wayne Mulligan's article.
The
basic premise is not new. In principle, during difficult times middle of the
road retailers takes it on the chin. The reason for this is simple. Low end
retailers that usually work on smaller margins and rely on high traffic for
profits end up getting higher traffic as more people migrate down-market to
stretch their dollars. High end retailers experience fluctuations but overall an
economic downturn has less consequence for the top 10% of the population -
measured by wealth. It is the mid-market retailer that gets hit by the middle
class.
This
is precisely the reason that CrossProfit analysts unanimously disagreed with our
friend and colleague Amit Chokshi, who by the
way has an excellent track record, when he concluded that Costco (COST) was a short back in November 2007. Read
Amit's analysis and the pursuing comments.
Wayne Mulligan is reiterating this well known concept.
However, it is always wise to check and see if the company is the right fit for
the right downturn. To assume that a company that has done well in a previous
recession will do well again in a subsequent recession is incorrect. Both
companies and consumers change over time as the needs and psyche of the public
migrate. For example, during the great depression, hair salons did well as
people wanted to feel and look good. Does this mean that beauty parlors did well
in the next recession or the one after that? Well, yes they did until the last
mini recession where the public psyche changed and fitness clubs did
better.
Today's Psyche
What
we have witnessed to date is that there are some major shifts in middle class
attitudes and behavior. The Costco example given above is intentional. When it
comes to food and basic necessities, shopping at a down-market establishment is
no longer taboo. Hence, Wal-Mart (WMT) and
Costco (COST) are gaining. Ironically, Target
(TGT) is not fairing well at this stage. This
has more to do with marketing and not getting their message out as they are a
down-market retailer just like the other two.
So
the public has chosen that food, basic consumables and perhaps energy (gas for
the car) is where they are going to pinch pennies. What we have to look for is
the 'hair salon' for the current downtrend. So far we have not identified what
the fad will be as people will always want to feel and look good. The harder
times get, the faster the new 'hair salon' takes root.
Testing Four Retailers for a
Recession
Mulligan suggests that the following four retailers fit
the criteria:
1)
Dollar Tree (DLTR)
2) Family Dollar Stores
(FDO)
3) Fred’s (FRED)
4) 99 cents Only Stores
(NDN)
A quick
overview reveals that two are regional players and two are
(U.S.) national
chains.
Dollar Tree (DLTR) is a national retailer that sells merchandise
priced at a dollar or less. DLTR also has Deal$ but essentially 95% of its 3400+
stores cater to the urge to buy cheap. This bodes well for recession economics.
To date DLTR's
chart reveals that we are in the early stages of a downturn.
Though margins have been hit on food items, management is repackaging the goods
- so to speak, whereby the price hasn't changed yet the customer is getting less
in terms of product. General merchandise seems to be holding up thus
far.
There is still
potential growth for DLTR as people need to satisfy their material addiction
that has been engraved into the psyche of middle class
America. Proof of this can be found by comparing same store
sales for footwear retailers costing $15 to $30. There, sales have already
declined considerably as consumers cut back on that extra pair of shoes.
However, the splurge for a non essential item that costs only one dollar
continues. Most goods carried at DLTR stores can be found at most Wal-Mart
stores at comparable prices.
Family Dollar Stores
(FDO) chart reveals that since mid 2007 the market is assuming that
FDO will lose out to the competition. FDO has 6,400 general merchandise stores
and though is considered a national discount store chain, prices are perceived
to be higher than Wal-Mart. The stores are conveniently located in shopping
centers or conveniently accessible stand alone
locations.
As per Reuters,
" The consumables category includes household chemical and paper
products, candy, snacks and other food, health and beauty aids, hardware and
automotive supplies, and pet food and supplies. The home products category
includes domestic items, such as blankets, sheets and towels, as well as
housewares and giftware. The apparel and accessories category includes men’s,
women’s, boys’, girls’ and infants’ clothing and shoes. The seasonal and
electronics category includes toys, stationery and school
supplies…" Merchandise carried at FDO
stores can be found at WMT, COST and TGT.
Management has relied
on the convenience factor, meaning that until now FDO did not deem it necessary
to compete on price, selection and quality. Wall Street is signaling that this
strategy is good during good times; however, in a downturn consumers will endure
the inconvenience of traveling the extra mile to the nearest Wal-Mart. The chain
has reported lower foot traffic patterns and associates this to customers
shopping less frequently.
I'm not sure I buy the
official jargon, rather inclined to accept defection as the primary cause. Based
on FDO's announced strategy for the remainder of 2008, it seems that management
has recognized the fact that customers now prefer going to one location for
everything. FDO is installing coolers in 500+ stores and is increasing its food
selection in 2800+ stores. This change in strategy accompanied with a marketing
plan to change its image could pan out to be a lucrative move and just in
time.
Fred’s (FRED) operates 690+ general merchandise stores in
the southeast, primarily catering to low and middle class
America. Prices are reasonable and notably pharmaceuticals
have contributed to growth in recent years. The 296 full service pharmacies
provide a degree of customer loyalty that meshes well with local mentality.
Customers end up doing their 'big shop' at
Fred's.
Fred's charts for
2007 and 2008 more or less mirror FDO charts for 2007 and 2008. This is because they both face the same competition for
the same class of merchandise from the big three; WMT, COST and TGT. A number of
Fred's locations are immune from head-on competition due to geographical
considerations; however, the majority of stores struggle to generate enough foot
traffic to justify the business model. The company plans to close 75
underperforming stores over the next year.
99 cents Only
Stores (NDN) has 251 general consumable
merchandise stores (as of 3/2007). Whereas Fred's is primarily a southeast
(U.S.) chain, NDN is primarily located in
California,
Texas and
Arizona. NDN's motto is "Nothing over $0.99, ever". This is
where the trouble begins. Food inflation has been rampant recently. Investors
are concerned about margins. NDN may be forced to finally abandon the 99 cents
scheme that has been its trademark since
1982.
In stark contrast with
Dollar Tree (DLTR), where goods over a dollar
are sold without major consequence, NDN may need a major image makeover in the
near future. This is the cause of the PPS decline (see 2007 and 2008 chart). NDN specials tend to outdo comparable competitor
sales, yet rely heavily on close-outs resulting in goods selection constantly
changing. The availability of goods for sale in the predetermined price range is
shrinking as is evident from the company's site. On an ongoing basis,
competitors are experimenting with equivalent close-out merchandise for just a
few pennies more - or so I am told
(unverified).
Disparaging P/E's
Dollar Tree
(
DLTR)
ttm P/E = 17+, forward P/E = 17+ as of
30/05/2008
|
|
Quarterly (May
'08) |
Annual (2008) |
Annual (TTM) |
|
Net Profit
Margin |
4.15%
|
4.74%
|
4.79%
|
|
Operating
Margin |
6.63%
|
7.79%
|
7.82%
|
|
EBITD
Margin |
-
|
11.54%
|
11.57%
|
|
Return on Average
Assets |
9.83%
|
10.97%
|
11.70%
|
|
Return on Average
Equity |
17.27%
|
18.67%
|
19.37% |
Family Dollar
Stores (
FDO)
ttm P/E = 14+, forward P/E = 17+ as of
30/05/2008
|
|
Quarterly (Mar
'08) |
Annual (2007) |
Annual (TTM) |
|
Net Profit
Margin |
3.45%
|
3.55%
|
3.14%
|
|
Operating
Margin |
5.26%
|
5.69%
|
4.94%
|
|
EBITD
Margin |
-
|
7.79%
|
7.14%
|
|
Return on Average
Assets |
9.87%
|
9.44%
|
8.15%
|
|
Return on Average
Equity |
22.12%
|
20.38%
|
17.05% |
Fred’s (
FRED)
ttm
P/E = 45+, forward P/E = 15+ as of
30/05/2008
|
|
Quarterly (Feb
'08) |
Annual (2008) |
Annual (TTM) |
|
Net Profit
Margin |
-0.89%
|
0.60%
|
0.60%
|
|
Operating
Margin |
-1.54%
|
0.92%
|
0.92%
|
|
EBITD
Margin |
-
|
2.52%
|
2.52%
|
|
Return on Average
Assets |
-3.00%
|
2.01%
|
2.01%
|
|
Return on Average
Equity |
-4.70%
|
2.89%
|
2.89%
|
99 cents Only Stores (
NDN)
ttm P/E = 90+, forward P/E = 40+ as of
30/05/2008
|
|
Quarterly (Dec
'07) |
Annual (2007) |
Annual (TTM) |
|
Net Profit
Margin |
2.93%
|
0.88%
|
0.53%
|
|
Operating
Margin |
3.75%
|
0.59%
|
0.04%
|
|
EBITD
Margin |
-
|
3.55%
|
2.81%
|
|
Return on Average
Assets |
5.85%
|
1.54%
|
0.97%
|
|
Return on Average
Equity |
7.27%
|
1.91%
|
1.20% |
Summary
The
above tables in conjunction with the forward P/E tells us exactly what the
market is expecting.
For
Dollar Tree (DLTR), investors were pleased with
latest quarter results. Growth is stagnant (2%) yet DLTR continues to open new
stores. "Shrink" (loss of merchandise) has been reduced thus stemming margin
erosion. ROE and ROA came in ahead of estimates. The market expects DLTR to be
flexible and increase prices if needed, to keep up with inflation. DLTR has
begun test marketing items priced at over $1 in several locations. DLTR is
maintaining its share buyback program and continues to outperform peers on both
net and operating margins.
For
Family Dollar Stores (FDO), this is one to keep an eye on
for 2009. For the remainder of 2008, FDO will be busy reinventing itself.
Investors need to take into account that there are capital outlays for coolers,
start-up costs for expanding product selection and an ongoing store renovation
project that was started last year. FDO has not announced new plans to buyback
shares in 2008 and I'm not expecting them to change their strategy.
Also, when reading the tables above, don't forget to take
into account the accounting change for FY2007. Pre-paid phone cards are now
recorded on a commission basis - without the amount collected for the service
provider - meaning that recorded sales are now pure profit thus increasing
operating margins. FDO has stated that the change is insignificant but has not
provided a breakdown.
For
Fred’s (FRED), two thirds of stores are
located in towns with a population of less than 15,000. In 2006, Fred's added
coolers to its stores thus targeting Federal food stamp customers. To date, this
strategy hasn't turned the tide on margins. Since 2005, the average P/E ratio
has declined from 23 in 2005 to 15 in 2007. Current price per share reflects
more of the same, as in - let's see this turnaround happen already! The
relatively high ttm P/E is due to a one time $0.11 loss per share recorded for
Q4 FY2008 (ended 1/31/08).
I
fail to see how a recession can help Fred's, being that it caters to customers
that aren't in best financial health during the good times. Any additional
recessionary customers, based on location and demographics, won't be earth
shattering.
For
99 cents Only Stores (NDN), this is a store that is geared
for the bargain hunter. NDN needs super specials to drive traffic and has
postponed the inevitable for now. When the time comes to maintain margins, the
market expects NDN to reinvent itself in a timely fashion. EBIT (earnings before
interest and taxes) has dwindled from 10.5% in FY2003 to 0.6% in
FY2007.
NDN
should increase traffic during a recession as there are likely to be more
bargain hunters both in California
and Texas. However, there is a big
question mark if this will translate into profits. Currently the market thinks
that the company can pull it off, hence, a forward P/E of over 30.
On a
personal note, I like a good bargain hunt, but I wouldn't count on feeding my
family based on what NDN happens to have in stock that day. Were we to have a
1929 style depression, I wouldn't be that picky. With other low cost retailers
in the mix, I question the market's resolution on this one.
I
hope this analysis has been helpful.
Disclosure: none.