"Legitimate concern about the risks to taxpayers and the economy posed by banks that are "too-big-to-fail" has prompted some observers, among them Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, to favor draconian limits on financial institution size. This is misguided. There are sizable gains from retaining large, complex, global financial institutions—and other ways to credibly protect taxpayers from the cost of government bailouts."

And the article goes on to make the detailed case for keeping intact our largest banks – in contrast to the recently expressed views of two former Federal Reserve chairs (Paul Volcker, Alan Greenspan) and – late Tuesday – the current governor of the Bank of England (Mervyn King), who are calling for these banks to be broken up in some fashion.

Professor Calomiris, to his credit, emphasizes (in his second paragraph) that we cannot currently deal with the failure of large cross-border financial institutions and this huge hole in our regulatory structures has helped and will help large banks to press for bailouts. But he also insists "the challenge of coordinating the efforts (when a bank fails) among different countries' regulators can be met through prearranged, loss-sharing arrangements that assign assets to particular subsidiaries based on clear rules. This would make it possible to transfer control over the assets and operations of a large international financial institution in an orderly fashion, in case of its failure."

Theoretically, he may be right.  But how far are we from being able to implement such a process?

The G20 should have taken this on as an essential priority at Pittsburgh, but it did not.  The IMF has for years pushed the European Union or at least the eurozone to adopt the kind of framework that Calomiris advocates, but to little avail.

Perhaps this is due to bureaucratic inertia.  More likely it is, once again, the blocking power of big banks.