key elements a borrower should have to obtain credit: character (integrity), capacity (sufficient cash flow to service the obligation), capital (net worth), collateral (assets to secure the debt), and conditions (of the borrower and the overall economy).

In an interesting twist of fate, the firms that have traditionally decided who should get credit have been put in the position of needing extraordinary amounts of other people's money just to stay alive. Unfortunately, based on what we've seen so far, including reports like those that follow, it's doubtful whether most, if not all, of today's troubled financial institutions would even qualify for a loan based on traditional measures of suitability -- like "character," for example -- if their friends in high places weren't so intimately involved in the process.

"Wall Street's Sham Profits" (Michael Corkery, Wall Street Journal Deal Journal blog)

My colleague Evan Newmark says that third-quarter economic growth is illusory–an economic confection created by heavily subsidized auto and home sales.

By that reasoning, what does this sham Main Street recovery say about Wall Street's apparent rebirth? It isn't hard to find a sham there, too.

While it is hard to unpack the nature of every profitable dollar at Goldman Sachs Group and J.P. Morgan Chase, for instance, one can make a compelling case that–like cars-for-clunkers–our Wall Street institutions are in one way or the other, also on the government dole.

The most obvious subsidy was the Troubled Asset Relief Program. While some financial institutions have made headlines for paying back TARP funds, the vast majority still owe the government billions. (TARP lent $238 billion to more than 680 banks; only 44 banks have repaid the funds, for a total of $71 billion)

Consider the other subsidies at play. In a recent Time magazine cover story, "What's Still Wrong With Wall Street" author Allan Sloan lays them out.

"The real bailout wasn't TARP. It was lending and guarantee programs from the Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. The Fed had a mere three borrowing programs before the crisis started in the summer of 2007, when two Bear Stearns hedge funds failed. At the height of the bailout, there were no fewer than 13 programs."

These programs enabled some Wall Street firms to borrow money at historically cheap rates, according to Sloan. At such levels, it isn't hard to turn a profit from the spreads between borrowing and lending.

"Much of the money that taxpayers have pumped into the financial system has ended up at banks that are lending it back to the government by buying Treasury securities. Isn't that great? We make money available to the banks at 0%, they lend it to the government at a markup, and they make money off our tax dollars, whining every step of the way," he writes.

And let us not forget the famous bailout of AIG. Unlike TARP, AIG doesn't need to pay back the $85 billion that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provided to pay off the insurer's credit default swap trades at 100 cents on the dollar.

As Bloomberg pointed out on Tuesday, Goldman received $14 billion when AIG canceled its trades. And according to this WSJ article today, Goldman was paid an additional $5.6 billion for selling the underlying investments behind its swaps to a government created toxic asset fund, called Maiden Lane III.

Other taxpayer subsidies for AIG counterparties, according to Bloomberg, include $16.5 billion that went to Societe General and $8.5 billion to Deutsche Bank (Not, of course, U.S. banks).

"Do Banks Have Something to Hide?" (Colin Barr, Fortune)

Even experts have a hard time getting a handle on how bad losses might get as the commercial real estate market implodes.

The banks have taken some lumps since the economy went bad. But some believe their biggest headaches are yet to come.

The pace at which U.S. commercial banks are adding to their loan loss reserves has slowed this year, while loans continue to go bad at a brisk pace.