A goal of The New Way Forward was to facilitate the Iraqis' efforts to enact all key legislation
by the end of 2007.
Between 2005 and 2007, Iraq spent only 24 percent of the $27 billion it budgeted for its own reconstruction efforts. More specifically, Iraq’s central ministries, responsible for security and essential services, spent only 11 percent of their capital investment budgets in 2007 -- down from similarly low rates of 14 and 13 percent in the 2 prior years. Violence and sectarian strife, shortage of skilled labor, and weak procurement and budgeting systems have hampered Iraq's efforts to spend its capital budgets.
Although oil production has improved for short periods, the May 2008 production level of about 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) was below the U.S. goal of 3 mbpd. The daily supply of electricity met only about half of demand in early May 2008. Conversely, State reports that U.S. goals for Iraq's water sector are close to being reached. The unstable security environment, corruption, and lack of technical capacity have contributed to the shortfalls.
The Departments disagreed with our recommendation, stating that The New Way Forward strategy remains valid but the strategy shall be reviewed and refined as necessary. We reaffirm the need for an updated strategy given the important changes that have occurred in Iraq since January 2007. An updated strategy should build on recent gains, address unmet goals and objectives and articulate the U.S. strategy beyond July 2008. (emphasis added -- MDC)
According to Congressional Research Service, we are now spending in the area of $12.5 billion per month.
Table 2 from CRS, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, Updated May 30, 2008.
Or, about 1% of U.S. GDP. (late addition -- on an annualized basis). Of course, this does not include costs for medical care out of theater, and VA costs, etc. These are only direct fiscal costs, as best as they can be counted. Furthermore, the expenditure per troop is rising (at least through FY06). From the CRS report:
GAO, CBO and CRS have all testified to Congress about the limited transparency in DOD's war cost estimating and reporting. While DOD has provided considerably more justification material for its war cost requests beginning with the FY2007 Supplemental, many questions remain difficult to answer -- such as the effect of changes in troop levels on costs -- and there continue to be unexplained discrepancies in DOD's war cost reports.
