Iran has long wanted to broaden its energy access to Central Asia.
A big part of Iran’s energy goals for Central Asia is the revival of a
plan to build a 1,420-mm-diameter natural gas pipeline that would begin
in Turkmenistan and run 870 miles along a route through northern Iran
to Turkey and onto the European market. Through such a route, Iran
would be able to both fulfill its supply demands in the north and reap
the benefits from the transit revenues between Central Asia and Turkey.
The Iranian option gives Iran the energy security it needs and the
economic clout it seeks in Central Asia, while giving the Turks and the
Europeans an alternative energy route.
However, there is the small matter of Iran being … well, Iran. For
Turkey to sign such a deal with the Iranians, and for such a project to
get the Western investment it needs to take off, the Iranians would
first have to come to some sort of rapprochement with the Americans to
lighten the political atmosphere. That would involve major
breakthroughs in the ongoing U.S.-Iranian negotiations over Iraq and
the Iranian nuclear program.
These negotiations are still in progress and are fraught with complications,
but the Turks are signaling that the Iranian option might not be an
impossible goal. After all, the Turks have sought a larger role as
mediator between Washington and Tehran in their negotiations to go
along with Turkey’s ongoing mediation efforts between Israel and Syria.
According to the Iranian oil minister, Turkey is planning to send its
energy and foreign ministers to Tehran in the near future to discuss
energy plans with the ayatollahs — a meeting that will need to be
watched closely for any signs that Ankara is at least ready to set the
groundwork in pursuing the Iranian option.
In pursuing Central Asian energy, however, the Turks will still face
an uphill challenge in convincing either Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan to
turn Westward. Russia has been slowly and steadily tightening its grip
over these Central Asian states, and will do whatever it takes to keep
Ashgabat and Astana in line with Russian interests. Post-Georgia,
Kazakhstan — which is arguably the former Soviet republic most exposed
to Russian threats — has already strongly hinted that it might give up
on the BTC line altogether and reorient itself almost completely to the
Kremlin (while keeping open its options with China). Though Turkey may
be flirting with the Kazakhs, Astana simply does not have much room to
maneuver in straying from Moscow’s wishes.
Geographically speaking, Turkmenistan is a more viable option for
the Turks to pursue. But even Turkmenistan will be extremely wary of
upsetting the Kremlin at this juncture, and has recently been in talks
with Alexei Miller, president of Russian firm Gazprom, to finalize a
price for a 25-year agreement for Gazprom to buy up all of
Turkmenistan’s natural gas, save for the small amount currently
destined for the Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline. Between China hungrily
pursuing Turkmen energy and the Russians fighting to maintain their
monopoly over Ashgabat’s energy sector, Turkmenistan is unlikely to
have much to offer to Turkey and the West, at least in the short term.
Turkey’s new interest in Central Asia
is the next logical step in the cascade of reactions to Russia’s
military action in Georgia. What Turkey will soon find, however, is
that there really are no good options when it comes to expanding energy
access to this part of the world — especially under the Kremlin’s watch.