• Strong fiscal stimulus, allowing a drop in the value of the real currency (a decline that’s already been substantial) in order to cushion exports.
• An easing of capital requirements to Brazil’s strong banking system, which will incentivize housing and car loans.
• Export financing.
• And huge local infrastructure projects.

There is another little-understood phenomenon that cushions the blows for emerging economies: Intra-emerging market trade has become increasingly important.  By now everybody understands that iron ore from Brazil and coal and oil from other emerging markets is flowing into China in order to fuel China’s massive infrastructure buildup and growing consumer demand.

The Breakdown on Brazil

Increasingly, a growing proportion of the infrastructure needs of industrial goods being bought by emerging economies are goods produced by other emerging economies.  Trade between Latin America and China has increased by 13 times since 1995, from $8.4 billion to $100 billion.  And China, now the second-most-important commercial partner to the region after the United States, has finally been accepted as a member of the Inter-American Development Bank, committing itself to contribute $350 million to the bank. As an example of this growth in industrial trade, Argentina just bought 279 subway cars from China’s CITIC Group.

However, not all trade with China has been successful, due to China’s notable deficiencies in quality control, especially in health standards.  For example, Latin American imports of medicines manufactured in China had catastrophic results in Panama two years ago, where more than 100 people died and hundreds more became ill from medications containing toxic Chinese glycerine.  Recently, Panama detected toxic chemicals in imported Chinese sweets and crackers and Argentina’s customs recently seized Chinese 20,000 thermos containers for having elevated content of toxic chemicals.

And all of this means that there is a market disconnect between the prices of Brazilian shares and those elsewhere in Latin American equities and the fundamentals of the underlying companies, that we will see played out in the next and subsequent years.  Why?

Just because huge financial losses by banks precipitated a massive de-leveraging cycle, which means they had to sell their holdings, regardless of merit. And that included big sell-offs in preferred investments, including the hugely promising and profitable Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras) (ADR: PBR), Vale (ADR: RIO), and many others.

And what is worse, their sales hit the stop losses of major hedge funds, who were also leveraged in such favorite plays as commodities, steel, coal, agro, emerging markets and even defensive stocks such as the U.S.-based Pepsico Inc. (PEP). 

When you have the proprietary positions of banks and hedge funds all trying to get out of the same door at the same time because of risk management issues, you get the current disconnect between market fundamentals and pricing.

Another impact that we have to understand is that the ongoing dramatic interest rate drops in all major G7 economies and the more than $3 trillion in G7 fiscal programs will have a marked impact on growth next year, containing what would have been a much nastier economic contraction.  But while G7 countries will barely grow between negative 0.5% and a positive 1% in 2009, with the worst contraction front-loaded and recovering in the second half, emerging economies will grow at a minimum of 4%, and in the case of China maybe as high as 10%.

In my October Brazil analysis, I detailed the massive stress that Brazil came under in 1995 because of another exogenous shock: The Mexican devaluation, the so-called “Tequila effect,” which ricocheted around the world, and which caught Brazil in 1995 in a much weaker position than it is in today.