And that goes to some of this price discovery I've been talking about and how we go through that price discovery process.Probably an even bigger smoking gun is this phrase by CEO Martin Sullivan, who, obviously had received all his substantiating data from none other than Joe Cassano.

(B)ecause this business is carefully underwritten and structured with very high attachment points to the multiples of expected losses, we believe the probability that it will sustain an economic loss is close to zero.

Did Sullivan and Joseph not have a regulatory obligation to disclose just how dire the economic loss potential on their "business" was simply as a result of the major CDO collateral calls (which they blew off as friendly banter)? Only the SEC knows the answer (and will likely take it to its grave).

Lastly, and maybe even more relevantly, is the question of the major discrepancies in disputed CDO marks between most counter parties and those of Goldman Sachs and SocGen. And while the SocGen collateral post demand has not been made clear in the email, that of Goldman, with their aggressively priced CDOs, results in a collateral call of nearly 13% ($3 billion) of GS's total negative basis exposure of $23 billion: more than double that of next closest disclosed counterparty Calyon which was at a total 7.6% collateral demand. What brought about this aggressive book mark down by GS, especially when these would have been marked in the orphan December month that ended up disappearing from financial statements? Did it have to do with the fact that the more substantial the write down, the greater the subsequent payoff to the firm (once the system became unravelled and taxpayers ended up paying Goldman and others for their collateral demands). Of course, the real question here, as everywhere else, is how much did Goldman do to precipitate the collapse: both of Bear, of Lehman, and of AIG.

This is an answer that only Cassano potentially would be able to shed some light on - is it not about time to have Joseph respond to a myriad of pent up questions about not only his potentially illegal conference call disclosures but also his conversations with major AIG counterparties such as Goldman Sachs?