VANCOUVER, July 31 /CNW/ - A paper presented at the Black Hat security
conference in Las Vegas (July 2009) by Alfredo Ortega and Anibal Sacco alleged
certain vulnerabilities in Absolute(R) Software Corporation's Computrace(R)
system that purportedly could be exploited to allow control of a device by
unauthorized persons. Absolute maintains that these allegations of
vulnerability are unfounded and systems with Computrace are secure.
Computrace is not a rootkit and is not rootkit-like in behavior. Contrary
to the authors' statements, Computrace by design does not attempt to hide in
the operating system or to evade control or modification of its settings by
the system administrator. The system administrator always maintains management
and control over the Computrace Agent. Our strength as a security solution
relies on our ability to persist into clean installs of the operating system.
Our BIOS module allows no special undetected path into the operating
system. Uncontrolled access to a computer system may allow some BIOS images to
be tampered with by an expert. Attempting to alter the Computrace BIOS module
for malicious purposes will not defeat conventional detection as claimed by
the authors. Any alteration to the BIOS module will cause any popular
antivirus software to alert the customer. More importantly, if the BIOS of a
computer has been compromised by an attacker, that machine is exposed to
innumerable other vulnerabilities far beyond the scope of the Computrace BIOS
module. The presence of the Computrace module in the BIOS in no way weakens
the security of the BIOS.
To clarify how Computrace operates:
- Computrace-equipped computers are shipped from the manufacturer with
the BIOS module turned off. The Computrace BIOS module is activated
by the installation of Absolute software by our customers, and is
never forced upon any user. Computrace is designed to be activated,
deactivated, controlled and managed by the customer using encrypted
channels.
- If a valid Computrace installation is removed or damaged the
persistent BIOS module will self-heal and restore the software and
administrator's settings.
The one example of BIOS stub code, version 785, given in the report is
not active in any BIOS to our knowledge. Our earliest released version of the
Computrace BIOS module was version 802 over five years ago. Even if the BIOS
vendor inadvertently included inactive dead code in the build of the BIOS
examined, Absolute has no method to activate this version and it cannot be
exploited by a malicious attacker.
On behalf of our customers, Absolute is committed to combating computer
crime and data theft in concert with our major PC OEM partners. Absolute
offers a unique solution to the increasing need to track, manage and protect
mobile computers.